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A recent paper by Burke et al. (henceforth “we”) finds a strong historical relationship between warmer-
than-average temperatures and the incidence of civil war in Africa (Burke et al. 2009).  These findings
have recently been challenged by Buhaug (2010) who finds fault with how we controlled for other
potential explanatory variables, how we coded civil wars, and with our choice of historical time period
and climate dataset.  We demonstrate that Buhaug’s proposed method of controlling for confounding
variables has serious econometric shortcomings and show that our original findings are robust to the
use of different climate data and to alternate codings of major war. Using Buhaug’s preferred climate
data under sound econometric assumptions yields results that suggest an even stronger relationship
between temperature and conflict for the 1981-2002 period than we originally reported.  We do find
that our historical relationship between temperature and conflict weakens over the last decade, a period
of unprecedented African economic growth and very few large wars.
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  A recent paper by Burke et al. (henceforth “we”) links historical variation in 
climate to the incidence of African conflict, with warmer-that-average temperatures 
related to large increases in civil war between 1981-2002 (Burke et al. 2009).  These 
results have recently been challenged, mostly notably by Buhaug (2010), who argues that 
our findings rely on an “unorthodox” understanding of civil war, on specific 
“methodological fixes”, and on the time period of analysis.  We demonstrate that 
Buhaug’s challenges depend on dubious econometric choices and on less relevant 
conceptualizations of conflict, and, that our original results are robust to alternative 
econometrically sound specifications, to different climate datasets, and to alternative 
ways of coding large wars.  At the same time, we find with Buhaug that African conflict 
appears less sensitive to climate over the past decade, a change likely related to the 




A number of methodological choices must be made to credibly estimate the effect 
of past climate variability on civil war.  One choice concerns how to control for the many 
other variables beyond climate that might affect conflict incidence.  Of particular concern 
is accounting for variables that are correlated with the explanatory variable(s) of interest, 
some of which are likely to be time-invariant and others that might trend over time.  For 
instance, hotter countries are on average much poorer, less democratic, and have lower 
educational attainment and worse health outcomes.
1  If (as seems likely) these differences 
are not explained by climate alone, then failing to control for them in some way will lead 
to biased estimates of the effect of climate variables on conflict (so-called “confounding” 
or “omitted variables bias”).  Unfortunately, the analyst might not have good data on – or 
even be aware of – all of the different confounding variables that affect conflict and are 
correlated with climate.  Thus eliminating omitted variables bias through explicit controls 
                                                        
1 E.g. see Dell, Jones, and Olken (2009).  Similar cross-sectional regressions show that warmer 
temperatures are associated with less democratic institutions, lower life expectancy, and lower adult 
literacy (results available on request).   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for all other explanatory variables is likely to be difficult, if not impossible (Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009).  
A related problem exists with time-trending factors that also correlate with 
climate.  As shown in Figure 1, both temperature and conflict were generally trending up 
over the study period.  Other conflict-relevant variables (such as per capita income and 
regime type) have also generally been improving since roughly 2000 in across the 
continent, and countless other variables (e.g. peacekeeping interventions, global export 
commodity prices, etc.) were also trending over time.  These common time trends make it 
all too easy to assert a relationship between two particular trending variables, when in 
fact a third variable is the key causal driver. 
Unfortunately, controlling explicitly for trends in variables such as income and 
political regime type likely introduces a second sort of estimation bias – simultaneity bias 
– that results from the two-way (“endogenous”) causal relationship between these 
variables and armed conflict.  For instance, slow income growth might make civil wars 
more likely, but civil wars are clearly also destructive to economic progress.  Even using 
lagged income measures is unlikely to solve this endogeneity problem, because economic 
actors may anticipate the outbreak of war and adjust investment accordingly (Miguel, 
Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004).   
Buhaug’s solutions to these well-worn econometric issues are unsatisfactory and 
yield biased estimates of the coefficients in question.  Buhaug either does nothing at all to 
control for either the time-invariant or time-varying factors correlated with conflict (as in 
his main results in Table 1)
 which leads to biased coefficient estimates due to the 
correlation between conflict and both time-invariant and time-trending variables.
2  Or he 
includes endogenous independent variables in his regression (and admits as such) in the 
form of lagged income in Table 3, which as any basic econometrics text explains biases 
all coefficient estimates in the regression (Wooldridge 2002).  Furthermore, if the effect 
of climate on conflict occurs through changes in income, as past work has argued (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004), then including both income 
                                                        
2 As a “robustness check”, Buhaug simply drops the fixed effects from the model.  This amounts to 
checking whether our results are robust to increasing the extent of omitted variables bias.  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and climate as regressors (as in all of Buhaug’s Table 3) should reduce the estimated 
effect of climate on conflict, which appears to be what Buhaug finds and then 
misinterprets as evidence of a diminished role of climate. Buhaug’s analytical approach 
thus reveals little of interest about the true causal relationship between climate and 
conflict. 
Our solution to these issues is the standard approach in economics and 
econometrics (Wooldridge 2002).  We use generic country indicator variables (called 
“fixed effects”) to control for all time-invariant country characteristics, and generic linear 
time trends to control for other time-trending variables.  Causal identification of the effect 
of climate on conflict is based on the fact that year-to-year variation in climate is 
essentially random, and thus exogenous to conflict conditions on the ground.  One 
potential downside of the fixed effects approach is that it is difficult to estimate the direct 
impact of other potential explanatory variables of interest (e.g. perhaps consistently 
democratic countries have less conflict).  The advantage – overwhelming, in our opinion 
– is that our coefficients of interest are unlikely to be biased by either omitted variables or 
endogeneity.  Put another way, these “methodological fixes” are what is required to 
generate unbiased estimates of the effects of climate on conflict. 
 
Results 
Using this approach, our baseline model then relates the incidence of civil war to 
country-specific deviations from trend in temperature and precipitation.  Using climate 
data from CRU (Mitchell and Jones 2005), Model 1 in Table 1 reproduces the original 
result in (Burke et al. 2009), with Model 2 updating these results with more recent 
Uppsala/PRIO conflict data as well as adding the few additional African countries 
missing from the original sample.  In the updated sample, the contemporaneous effect of 
temperature declines slightly in magnitude but remains significant at the 90% confidence 
level, and the sum of the contemporaneous and lagged temperature effects is nearly 
identical to our earlier findings.  Surprisingly, and contrary to the thrust of Buhaug’s 
argument, running the same specifications with Buhaug’s preferred climate data 
(discussed below) significantly strengthens the estimated relationship between 
temperature and conflict (Models 3 and 4):  a 1 degree C increase in temperature results  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in a greater than 10% increase in the historical risk of conflict, which is roughly double 
what we estimated in our earlier work, and this effect is significant at over 95% 
confidence.  Buhaug’s climate data, when used within a sound econometric framework 
with fixed effects, strengthens rather than undermines our results.
3 
  To address Buhaug’s concern that our previous work made arbitrary assumptions 
about the functional form of the time trend controls, Table 2 explores robustness to 
alternative approaches to controlling for these trends.  Our temperature coefficient is 
robust to whether or not we control for country-specific time trends (columns 1 and 2) or 
a common time trend across countries (columns 3 and 4), and to whether these trends are 
linear (columns 1 and 3) or quadratic (columns 2 and 4).  Thus the specific functional 
form of the time trend controls does not affect our results. 
  A further concern raised by Buhaug is that our original study focused only on the 
incidence of large wars (those years in which a given war resulted in >1000 battle 
deaths), whereas many earlier benchmark studies focused on conflict onset (e.g. Fearon 
and Laitin (2003)) or on smaller wars with fewer casualties (e.g. Miguel, Satyanath, and 
Sergenti (2004)).  Buhaug’s preferred coding of civil war focuses on the onset of 
conflicts that eventually accumulate 1000 battle deaths.  
We have four responses to this concern.  First, there is no theoretical reason a 
priori to prefer one measure to another, in our view, and arguably our initial focus on the 
incidence of the largest wars captures the relevant outcome of interest to policymakers.  
Our focus tackles the central question in the ongoing debate on climate and conflict: can 
climate help explain the occurrence of the most destructive wars?  Second, Buhaug’s 
preferred coding of civil war onset is arguably a less attractive interpretation of the likely 
effects of climate variables on conflict:  if climate shocks depress rural incomes and 
lower the opportunity cost of joining rebellions (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004), 
the years in which small wars become larger wars – i.e. the years in which negative 
climate shocks induce more people to rebel – are of particular interest.  Smaller-scale 
conflict might be more consistent with “narratives of environmental marginalization”, as 
                                                        
3 Buhaug does not report these specifications.  He uses his own climate data only in his Table 3, which 
employs logit specifications and include likely endogenous regressors (e.g. GDP per capita lagged one 
period) and – in the absence of fixed effects – a quite narrow set of other controls.    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Buhaug argues, but are almost certainly less destructive than the years of serious conflict 
that our coding attempts to capture.  Third, interpreting our measure of civil war as 
“unorthodox” is to misread decades of political science research on the subject.  The 
1000 battle death threshold has long been the standard in the well-known Correlates of 
War data, as well as in earlier manifestations of the PRIO data.  From a historical 
perspective, the more recent 25-battle-death measure would appear a more significant 
challenge to orthodoxy. 
Finally, estimating the effects of climate on small conflicts is less a robustness test 
than an answer to a somewhat different question.  Concluding that climate has no effect 
on small conflicts is interesting in its own right, but not obviously relevant to the 
relationship between climate and large wars.
4  As noted above, there are many reasons to 
suspect that these larger wars could be differentially affected by climate.  Nevertheless, in 
Table 3 we explore how both large and small wars respond to climate.  Similar to 
Buhaug, we find a weaker relationship between temperature and the incidence or onset of 
all wars with at least 25 battle deaths (Models 3-4), where onset is coded as the first year 
in which a particular conflict crosses the battle-death threshold of interest.  However, 
consistent with other recent studies (e.g. Hendrix and Salehyan (2010); Witsenburg and 
Adano (2009)), we do find a positive relationship between contemporaneous rainfall and 
the incidence of all conflicts (small and large wars), and thus climate changes might still 
be important drivers of these conflicts.  
  As Table 3 shows, our climate data do successfully predict the onset of large wars 
as well as their incidence (Models 1 and 2).  We retain similar temperature coefficient 
estimates whether we drop from the sample the years following onset in which the war 
continued (as in Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), and as shown in Model 2), or 
code all non-onset years as “0” and keep them in the sample (as in Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), not shown).   Thus positive temperature deviations appear to explain both when 
                                                        
4 Analogously, a finding that climate has little effect on non-African civil wars (which indeed is what the 
country data seem to show) is interesting, but tells us little about climate and African civil wars – the 
purported topic of interest.  As with the relationship between climate and large wars, there are reasons to 
expect that climate would exert disproportionate pressure on African economic and political outcomes 
relative to other regions. 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wars become large, and whether they continue to be particularly destructive over time. 
This set of findings refutes Buhaug’s claims about climate and large wars. 
  Finally, Table 4 explores the sensitivity of our results to the use of an alternative, 
independent climate dataset from Matsuura and Willmott (2009) – the “UDel” data.  
Model 1 in Table 4 re-runs our baseline specification over the 1981-2002 period using the 
UDel data, yielding very similar results to the CRU.  Buhaug’s analysis retains the CRU 
temperature data but (somewhat inexplicably) replaces precipitation with data from 
GPCP (Adler et al. 2003).  As noted above, using this combination of datasets in our 
preferred specifications yields a much stronger relationship between climate and conflict 
than we had reported in our earlier work.  Consistent with similar sensitivity tests 
reported in our original work, our results are not an artifact of the specific climate 
dataset.
5  
Unlike our baseline climate dataset (CRU 2.1), the UDel data allow us to extend 
our analysis through 2008.  We do not think that changing the study time period 
constitutes a “robustness test” but rather an answer to a slightly different question:  i.e., 
were African economic and political institutions as sensitive to variation in climate over 
the most recent decade as they were over the previous two?  Africa was clearly a different 
continent over the last decade compared to the two decades previous (Miguel 2008).  As 
Table 5 shows, average annual per capita GDP growth over 2003-2008 was six times 
higher than the 1981-2002 period (where it was near zero), and the Polity Score (a -10 to 
+10 measure of democratic political institutions) improved an average of more than 4 
points between the two periods.   If there are effects of income growth or regime type on 
the risk of conflict, as past studies have suggested (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), then these changes would reduce 
Africa’s overall conflict propensity.  As shown in Figure 1, this propensity does seem to 
have fallen over the last few years across the continent, at least for large wars. 
Our results for the most recent decade are consistent with this view.  Model 2 in 
Table 4 suggests that the relationship between climate and conflict over the 2003-2008 
                                                        
5 We conducted similar tests in the original work with two additional alternative datasets (GPCP and NCC), 
with results reported in the supplementary material.  Our results over the 1981-2002 period are robust to 
these different data as well.  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period is not significantly different than zero at standard confidence levels.  The reasons 
for this apparent decline in sensitivity to climate remain unclear, however, and it’s 
possible that other factors beyond strong economic performance or democratization 
might have also played a role in this apparent decline in sensitivity to climate, such as the 
recent increase in international peace-making and peace-keeping efforts across Africa 
(Human Security Report Project 2007).  Understanding what exactly occurred to reduce 
the sensitivity of African conflict to hot temperatures and low rainfall, and whether these 
changes are likely to be fleeting or permanent, is thus of paramount importance.   
 
Conclusion 
  Overall, we find little support for Buhaug’s methodological criticisms of our 
earlier work, with our original results largely insensitive to credible controls for other 
explanatory variables, for alternative codings of major wars, or to different choices of 
climate datasets.  Buhaug’s dubious econometric choices in many of his specifications – 
including his decision not to control for country fixed effects or deal adequately with time 
trends in many specifications, or his willingness include endogenous regressors that bias 
all of his coefficients – further call into question his results.  This of course does not 
imply that climate is solely “to blame” for African civil wars, as Buhaug’s provocative 
title would suggest that we are arguing.  Rather it implies that during a particularly 
violent recent period in African history, variation in climate was a significant contributor 
to the incidence of large, destructive civil wars.  We believe that this relationship is both 
robust and of significant interest to policy-makers tasked with reducing the incidence or 
impact of future conflicts. 
We do confirm that the climate-conflict relationship has weakened substantially in 
Africa in recent years, and are hopeful that whatever economic and political changes have 
occurred will persist in the coming years, thus lessening the potential adverse impacts of 
future warming on African conflict.  However, it is equally possible that the coming 
decades in Africa will resemble the 1980s and 1990s more than the last decade, and thus 
understanding the causes of these recent changes is a critical area for future research. 
  9 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 Table 1: Results with original and updated sample, 1981-2002. Model (1) uses the original sample in ref (1),
and model (2) an updated sample with the most recent Uppsala/PRIO data (v4, 2009) and three additional
African countries missing from the original sample (Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, and Mauritius). Models
(3) and (4) use Buhaug’s climate data for the original and updated PRIO data (the sample size reﬂects the
observations for which climate data were available in the Buhaug data). All models include country ﬁxed
effects and country-speciﬁc time trends, with Huber-White standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
country level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Civil war Civil war Civil war Civil war
temperature 0.043 0.035 0.063 0.073
(0.022) (0.018) (0.028) (0.032)
temperature lag (1 year) 0.013 0.022 0.043 0.057
(0.023) (0.028) (0.025) (0.035)
precipitation -0.023 0.009 0.020 0.038
(0.052) (0.037) (0.075) (0.076)
precipitation lag (1 year) 0.025 0.024 0.097 0.117
(0.049) (0.035) (0.062) (0.069)
Constant -1.127 -1.194 -2.423 -3.061
(0.780) (0.870) (1.103) (1.502)
Number of Observations 889 968 867 867
R squared 0.657 0.641 0.668 0.650
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
1Table 2: Models with country-speciﬁc or common time trends, linear and quadratic. Data are the updated
sample from Table 1, 1981-2002. All models include country ﬁxed effects, with Huber-White standard
errors adjusted for clustering at the country level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Civil war Civil war Civil war Civil war
temperature 0.035 0.035 0.037 0.036
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
temperature lag (1 year) 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
precipitation 0.009 0.020 0.021 0.021
(0.037) (0.046) (0.049) (0.050)
precipitation lag (1 year) 0.024 0.041 0.009 0.008
(0.035) (0.043) (0.048) (0.048)
Constant -1.194 -1.144 -1.231 -1.102
(0.870) (0.898) (0.900) (0.883)
country-speciﬁc time trends Yes Yes No No
country-speciﬁc time squared No Yes No No
common time trend No No Yes Yes
common time squared No No No Yes
Number of Observations 968 968 968 968
R squared 0.641 0.675 0.473 0.473
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
2Table 3: Alternate coding of civil war. Model (1) is our standard coding of civil war incidence (years with
>1000 battle deaths), Model (2) is large war onset; Models (3) and (4) repeat the exercise for large and small
wars combined (all years with >25 battle deaths). Data are the updated sample from Table 1. All models
include country ﬁxed effects and country-speciﬁc time trends, with Huber-White standard errors adjusted
for clustering at the country level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Civil war War onset Any war Any onset
temperature 0.035 0.034 0.014 0.007
(0.018) (0.018) (0.037) (0.026)
temperature lag (1 year) 0.022 0.000 -0.018 -0.022
(0.028) (0.022) (0.030) (0.027)
precipitation 0.009 -0.004 0.102 0.028
(0.037) (0.039) (0.055) (0.049)
precipitation lag (1 year) 0.024 0.006 0.047 -0.008
(0.035) (0.020) (0.048) (0.042)
Constant -1.194 -0.837 -0.022 0.173
(0.870) (0.692) (1.239) (0.752)
Number of Observations 968 889 968 783
R squared 0.641 0.226 0.648 0.236
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
3Table 4: Results using UDel climate data, for periods 1980-2002 (Model 1) and 2003-2008 (Model 2). All
models include country ﬁxed effects and country-speciﬁc time trends, with Huber-White standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the country level.
(1) (2)
Civil war Civil war
UDel temperature 0.042 -0.012
(0.020) (0.019)
UDel temperature lag 0.004 -0.024
(0.026) (0.041)
UDel precipitation 0.030 0.083
(0.028) (0.079)




Number of Observations 1056 288
R squared 0.645 0.592
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
4Table 5: Early and late period GDP per capita growth and Polity score, average across Sub-Saharan Africa.
GDP data are from Penn World Tables (Heston et al 2009), and Polity data from the PolityIV Project (Mar-
shall et al 2009)
1981-2002 2003-2008
GDP per capita growth 0.5 2.8
Polity Score (-10 to 10) -2.5 1.8
5Figure 1: Trend in Sub-Saharan African conﬂict and temperature, 1960-2008. Dark red indicates number of
large wars (>1000 deaths) ongoing in a particular year, and light red the number of small wars (>25 deaths)
ongoing, based on the Uppsala/PRIO data. Blue line indicates continental average temperature (right Y-axis,
from UDel data).
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
0
5
10
15
20
23
23.5
24
24.5
25
6